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Productivity Changes in the Economy
THIS chapter is devoted to a description of average changes in the private
domestic economy since 1889. It provides the background for later analy-
sis of the role of productivity in aggregate economic growth and a standard
for comparison of productivity changes in the individual industries of the
economy. The economy-wide estimates will also be useful. for international
comparison and analysis, but this use lies beyond the scope of the present
volume.
Special interest attaches to over-all productivity indexes as the best
available measures of net changes in the productive efficiency of the
economy as a whole. In effect, the index of productivity in the private
domestic economy is a weighted average of productivity indexes for the
various industries. The component-industry measures show considerable
dispersion and irregularity of movement. This is due partly to chance
elements affecting innovation, and the incidence of increasing
returns, but it also reflects changing relative amounts of investment de-
voted to improvement of efficiency in the various industries. Only by
study of the aggregate measure can we see the net effect of industry
productivity changes and the degree of regularity of the forces promoting
improved efficiency in the economy as a whole.
We shall examine both secular trends and shorter-period fluctuations
in total factor productivity and the partial productivity ratios.The
analysis is confined largely to the private domestic economy; the national
product and productivity estimates are subject to some downward bias
because of the method of estimating real product originating in the govern-
ment and in the rest-of-the-world sectors. Since we later use the national
productivity estimates for analysis of aggregate economic growth, however,
we shall compare long-period productivity trends in the private domestic
and total national economies. The differences are relatively minor, for
the private domestic economy accounted for more than 90 per cent in all
peacetime years.
Secular Trends
The long-term growth of total factor productivity and the partial product-
ivity ratios will first be described in terms of average annual rates of
change between 1889 and 1957. Inspection of the time series on an annual
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basis reveals a distinct change in trend about 1919; so rates of growth over
the two segments of the long period will also be computed. More compli-
cated methods of trend fitting are employed, but these give virtually the
same average rates of change as are obtained by use of the simpler com-
pound interest formula.
THE LONG PERIOD, 1889—1957
Total factor productivity—variant measures. Between the terminal years of
the period 1889—1957, productivity increased at an average annual rate
of approximately 1.7 per cent in the private domestic economy (see
Table 1 and Chart 1).Since the real private domestic product grew at
TABLE 1
Private Domestic Economy:
Growth Rates in Real Product and Productivity Ratios, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage rates of change)
Real Gross Real Cross Product perUnit of Real Gross Product
Product Total per Manhour
Factor Labor Capital (unweighted)
Input Input Input
1889—1957 3.5 1.7 2.0 1.0 2.4
1889—1919 3.9 1.3 1.6 0.5 2.0
1919—57 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.3 2.6
SouRcE: Table A-XXIL
an average annual rate of 3.5 per cent over the same sixty-eight year period,
it is evident that about half of the growth in output was accounted for by
additions to real labor and capital inputs, and half was contributed by
increases in the efficiency with which the inputs were utilized, i.e., in
productivity.The relative importance of productivity has been still
greater in recent decades. But even the 1.7 per cent a year secular rate,
when compounded, would result in a doubling of real private domestic
product every forty years due to productivity growth alone; the 3.5 per
cent annual rate of growth of real product as a whole results in a doubling
every twenty years, on the average.
The rate of growth of productivity in the total national economy using
the estimates of either the Commerce Department or Kuznets (national
security version) is lower—i .6 per cent, as shown in Table 2. There is
reason for thinking that these more comprehensive estimates understate
actual productivity gains.The Commerce Department uses explicit
conventions for estimating real product originating in the rest-of-the-world
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productivity of public resources must have increased over the period since
many of the same technological improvements have been introduced in
government as in private industry.' This must also have been true of
real net capital stocks located abroad, but the estimates of real net factor
income from abroad do not reflect it.
TABLE 2
Alternative Economic Sectors and Variant Concepts of National Product:
Growth Rates in Real Product, Input, and Productivity, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage rates of change)






Private domestic 3.46 1.70 1.73
Private national 3.47 1.75 1.69
Total national: 1.92
Commerce concept 3.50 1.55
Kuznets concepts:
National security 3.50 1.55
Peacetime 3.39 1.44
SOuRCE: Tables A-XIX through A-XXII.
aIfreal net product estimates are used, the growth rates are higher by 0.01 percentage
point in the national security concept of the total economy; 0.02 percentage point higher
in the private national economy; 0.03 percentage point higher in the Commerce national
economy concept; and lower by 0.01 percentage point in the peacetime concept of the
national economy.
Inclusion of the general-government and rest-of-the-world sectors raises
real factor input proportionately more than real product in the total
national economy as compared with the private domestic economy. The
difference in average annual rates of change is 0.22 percentage point for
input and 0.04 for real product.2 Thus, the input of the two sectors rose
even more than private domestic product. Reference to Table 2 indicates
that the rest-of-the-world sector accounted for 0.04 percentage point of the
difference between productivity growth in the private domestic and total
national economies with the larger government sector accounting for the
bulk of the total 0.18 percentage point difference. The proportionate
difference between the two rates of growth differs somewhat by subperiod.
It is apparent that the differences shown are not major. Even if it were
assumed that productivity in the total national economy rose at the 1.73
]. See the experimental measures compiled by Henry Lytton, "Recent Productivity
Trends in the Federal Government: An Exploratory Study," The Review of Economic
Statistics, November 1959, p. 341.
2 The greater relative discrepancy in the period since 1919 is traceable to our inclusion
of the input of capital as well as of labor commanded by government, whereas the Com-
merce real government product estimates parallel the government labor input measure
alone. Labor and capital inputs showed parallel movements between 1889 and 1919, but
between 1919 and 1957 capital in this sector rose relative to labor input.
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average annual percentage rate calculated for the private domestic
economy instead of 1.55, then real national product would have risen at an
average annual rate of 3.68 instead of at 3.50 as computed.
The Kuznets estimates (national security version) imply about the same
rate of change in total factor productivity as the Commerce estimates,
although there are several conceptual differences between the two series,
as explained in Chapter 2. The chief difference is that Kuznets excludes
estimated public services to business from final product while the Com-
merce Department includes all government purchases of goods and
services. The amount involved is not large, and the conventions used by
Kuznets to measure real government services to consumers and, by
implication, real intermediate services to business result in a relatively
stable ratio of the latter to real national product in the terminal years
(see Appendix A, section on "Private purchases of goods and services").
Because the two sets of estimates yield much the same secular rate of
productivity advance, it is plain that the Kuznets series also imply no
advance in productivity of the factors employed in the public and foreign
sectors.There is, however, some divergence in subperiod movements
between the two series.Since the Kuznets conventions for excluding
government real-cost services are quite arbitrary, the Commerce estimates
are better suited to the study of productivity movements as such. Kuznets'
estimates (national security version) will, nevertheless, be used for analysis
of the interactions of productivity and economic growth because his
national product estimates permit a complete breakdown by the broad
purposes toward which economic activity is directed.
The rates of change in the Kuznets peacetime version of the national
product are also shown in Table 2.In this version, Kuznets excludes
national security outlays from final product on the grounds that they do
not contribute directly to economic welfare but are merely a precondition
for production and hence may be classed as intermediate.Since the
proportion of total real gross national product devoted to national security
purposes increased from 0.4 per cent in 1889 to 9.2 per cent in 1957, the
average annual rate of growth of real product and productivity by the
peacetime version was 0.11 percentage point lower over the sixty-eight-
year period than by the national security version. Again, the differences
vary by subperiod, depending on the changes in the distribution of the
national product as between national security and civilian purposes.
We do not carry consideration of the peacetime version beyond this
comparison and presentation of the basic estimates on which it is based
(Tables A-I and A-Il). It is only necessary to extend Kuznets' argument
to read that national security is a goal equivalent to welfare in peacetime
as well as in wartime to justify use of the more inclusive measures. In any
case, from the standpoint of our interest in the productive capacity or
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productivity of resources, itis desirable to use measures that do not
fluctuate with changes in the degree of international tension, since the
resources devoted to national security can be shifted to the production of
consumer or capital goods without substantially affecting total product
inclusive of national security outlays.Subsequent analysis of national
productivity movements is therefore based on national product measures,
including the output of security items in all years.
A final comparison relates to product estimates gross and net of capital
consumption allowances. In the next chapter, we use real net national
product and productivity measures. These are theoretically preferable
since the production of capital goods required to offset that part of the
stock consumed in the production process does not add to welfare any
more than does the output of any other intermediate goods and services.
Actually, the estimation of real capital consumption presents serious
conceptual and statistical problems that make the net measures less
accurate than the gross. Further, since estimates of real capital consump-
tion are not available for most industry groups, our analysis of real
private product (used later for comparison with industry real-product
estimates) is based on the gross estimates. The figures in the footnote to
Table 2 indicate that the broad real gross and net product estimates are
virtually interchangeable if Kuznets' estimates of real capital consumption
are accepted. Ideal measures of net product, were they available, might
show greater divergence of movement from the gross measures.
The partial productivity ratios. The index of total factor input is a weighted
average of the indexes of the two major inputs, labor and capital, each of
which may also be related to output. Since capital per unit of labor input
increased by about 1 per cent a year on balance between 1889 and 1957,
output per unit of capital input shows a significantly smaller average
annual increase than output per unit of labor input—i per cent as com-
pared with 2 per cent (see Table 1).
For reasons adduced in Chapter 2, aggregate labor and capital inputs
were computed by weighting manhours and real capital stocks in the
various industry groups by the compensation per unit of labor and capital
in each.Since both labor and capital inputs have shown a persistent
tendency to increase more rapidly in the higher-paying industries, the
weighted input indexes have increased more than the unweighted. This
is a rough measure of the increasing quality of resources resulting from
interindustry transfers of resources to the extent that relative unit corn-
pensations indicate the relative marginal productivities of the resources
in the various uses.
When output is related to unweighted indexes of the two factor inputs,
the productivity ratios rise faster than in the measures we have used.
Output per manhour increases at an average rate of 2.4 per cent a year
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compared with the 2.0 per cent rise in output per unit of (weighted) labor
input; and output per unit of capital (unweighted) increases by 1.1 per
cent a year compared with 1.0 per cent for output per unit of (weighted)
capital input. The ratio of output to a combination of both unweighted
factor input indexesincreases at an average annual rate of 2.0 per cent
compared with the 1.7 per cent shown by the preferred total factor
productivity measure.
Our method of weighting inputs by industry has the distinct advantage
that the productivity ratios are not affected merely by the relative shift
of resources among industries4—the over-all productivity index is thus
conceptually an internally weighted mean of the productivity indexes for
the component industries. It can be compared with the industry indexes
without the necessity of explaining that part of the change in the aggregate
is due to interindustry shifts since these affect input rather than productivity
by our procedure. The productivity indexes computed by using internal
weights for the inputs are thus a purer measure of changes in technological
efficiency as such. Another advantage is that they better indicate the
extent to which rates of unit factor compensation in given employments
can be raised consistent with stable average product prices. This is not
true of productivity indexes using unweighted inputs since part of the
"productivity" increase accrues to the factors as a result of upgrading.
THE BREAK IN TREND
Annual estimates of real private domestic product and associated factor
inputs are plotted in Chart 2, and the derived estimates of total factor
productivity, in Chart 3. Examination of the annual index numbers of
total factor productivity reveals a distinctly higher trend since World War I
than that which prevailed in the three prior decades. Rates of growth
computed between the terminal years of the two periods are 1.3 per cent
a year for 1889—1919 and 2.1 per cent for 1919—57. Actually, the change
in trend could be interpreted as beginning in 1917, but it is more con-
venient for us to use the key year 1919 as the dividing point. The results
are not substantially affected.
Trend lines fitted by the method of least squares to the two segments of
the time series show the same rate of growth for the more recent period,
but a somewhat lower rate for the early period—l.03 per cent. The
difference arises because productivity in 1889 is below the trend line,
whereas in 1919 it is above, as is apparent in Chart 3. Estimated product-
ivity in both 1919 and 1953 is above the trend line; so the rate computed
from terminal years is the same as that indicated by the method of least
Manhours and unweighted capital input are combined by changing shares of' national
income in key years (see Table A-XXII).
4 Effects of intra-industry shifts are not eliminated.
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PRODUCTIVITY CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY
CHART 3
Private Domestic Economy: Trends in Total Factor Productivity, 1889—1957
squares.5 Subsequent estimates for 1953—57 continue to fall around the
trend line, although 1957 is a bit lower relative to the trend than is 1953.
An alternative method of fitting a trend is illustrated, for 1919—53, by
the dashed line in Chart 5. Here, the logarithms of total factor productivity
are related to time and to the ratio of civilian employment to the civilian
labor force. By holding the employment ratio constant at a relatively full
employment level (0.965) the calculated net trend tends to pass through
Glover's method, which minimizes the sum of the squares of arithmetic deviations,
yields the same growth rate for the early period as the usual least squares method, but a
higher average rate for the recent period (2.23 per cent versus 2.10 per cent).
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the productivity estimates for years of high employment. The indicated
trend rate of increase is 2.0 per cent a year. This type of net trend is useful
for the projection of productivity to years in which full employment is
assumed. The estimating equation indicates that for each 1.0 per cent
decline in the employment ratio, productivity deviates from its calculated
trend value by approximately 0.6 per cent.
Although it is preferable to calculate trend rates of growth by a method
of least squares, we shall generally use the simpler compound interest
formula applied to terminal years of subperiods or long periods. The
differences between the two methods are not great since the terminal years
are years of relatively high economic activity and, in any case, productivity
indexes fluctuate less than most economic variables. The compound
interest calculation is also used because annual estimates are not available
for many of the industry productivity series with which the estimates for
the private domestic economy are compared later.
Less confidence can be placed in estimates for decades prior to 1889,
but it is of interest that the average rate of increase in total factor product-
ivity between the decade averages for 1869—78 and 1889—98 is 1.2 per cent
a year, which is in line with the 1.3 per cent for the subsequent quarter
century. The rate would be somewhat less if correction were made for
the downward bias of the estimates for the first decade, resulting from the
undercount of the Census of 1870. This defect in the national product
estimates results in the appearance of an extraordinarily high rate of
increase in real product and productivity between 1869 and 1879, which
is reduced by the use of the decennial averages. Because of doubts as to
the accuracy of the early estimates, however, we confine the analysis of
productivity changes to the period since 1889.
Between 1889 and 1919, the rates of growth of both of the major partial
productivity ratios were significantly less than in the more recent period
(see Chart 4). Acceleration after 1919 is much more marked in the output-
capital ratio, with the average rate of change in this ratio rising from 0.5
per cent to 1.3 per cent a year. The average annual rates of increase in
output per unit of labor were 1.6 per cent and 2.3 per cent in the two
periods. In the early period, capital stocks, on balance, were being built
up more rapidly relative to the labor force than they were after 1919.
In some industries prior to World War I, capital was growing even faster
than output; since then the reverse tendency has prevailed in almost all
industries (see Chapter 6).
A similar picture emerges from an aggregate of independently estimated
output series, accounting for more than half of the national income origi-
nating in the private domestic economy, in relation to independently
derived capital series and to manhour series which are part of the broader
aggregate. The pertinent growth rates are shown in Table 3. The acceler-
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ation since 1919 is even more pronounced than it is in the sector as a
whole, which confirms the notion of a distinct break in trend.
Although there is little evidence of further acceleration in total factor
productivity over the years since World War I, the rate of increase in real
private product per manhour since World War II has been higher than
in the interwar period. This is discussed by Fabricant in his introduction,
and in a report by the Bureau of Labor Statistics released as this volume
was being prepared for press.6 Using essentially the same series on real
private product per manhour as is presented here, the BLS report notes
that for 1909—58 a curvilinear trend fits the data better than a straight-
line trend. When, however, the period 19 19—58 is used, and when a
6Trendsin Outputper Manhour inthe Private Economy, 1909—1958, BLS Bulletin 1249,
December 1959.
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variable is introduced to represent the rate of utilization of capacity, the
degree of acceleration is sharply reduced. It is further reduced if the data
back to 1889 are used. For the private nonfarm sector separately, no
acceleration of real product per manhour is apparent after
TABLE3
Private Domestic Economy, Covered-Industry Sectora
Growth Rates in Output and Productivity Ratios, 1889—1953











1889—1953 3.2 1.7 1.9 1.0
1889—1919 3.1 0.6 0.8 0.1
1919—53 3.2 2.6 2.8 1.9
Table A-XXV.
aAggregateof industry segments for which capital and labor input indexes as well as
output indexes are available: farming, mining, manufacturing, transportation, and
communications and public utilities; trade from 1929 forward.
Acceleration after 1947 in real product per manhour for the private
economy can largely be explained in terms of a much higher rate of
increase in real capital per manhour after World War II than in the inter-
war period. Acceleration is not significant in the total productivity measure
since capital is included in the denominator of the ratio. Any projection of
the postwar rate of increase in real private product per manhour would be
predicated on a continuing high rate of increase in real capital stock per
manhour, other things equal. But since this and the other causal forces are
subject to change, any projection of a trend line beyond the historical
period is hazardous.
It is not possible adequately to analyze the factors that may have been
responsible for the change in productivity trend around the time of World
War I, although it is a subject worthy of further investigation. A step in
this direction can be taken by noting a few changes that occurred about
the same time in associated variabies. The scientific management move-
ment, based on the ideas of Frederick W. Taylor, spread widely in the
1920's; college and graduate work in business administration expanded
rapidly; and it was only after 1919 that organized research and develop-
ment became a significant feature of the industrial landscape(see
Chapter 4). It has also been suggested that the drastic change in national
immigration policy promoted a more rapid increase in the average
Ibid., p.27.
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education of the labor force.That is, since the immigrants had less
schooling, on the average, than the domestic labor force, the mass influx
of workers from abroad prior to World War I had tended to retard the
increase in average education.8
It is tempting to enumerate specific innovations that became important
after 1919, such as mass or "flow" production techniques in manufacturing.
Certainly,there was a remarkable accelerationinmanufacturing
productivity in the 1920's.But significant innovations were occurring
throughout the whole period; short of a thorough study of their cost-
reducing impact, it would not be possible to isolate those that contributed
most to the speeding-up of productivity advance.
Temporal Variations in Growth Rates
SUBPERIOD CHANGES
In the private domestic economy as a whole, rates of growth over sub-
periods of approximately a decade in length have been relatively close to
the longer-term trend rates. They are notably more stable than the sub-
period rates in most of the industry groups surveyed later because the
variations of the industry rates tend to be offsetting. The offsetting nature
of divergent industry rates may be in part a result of random factors and
in part a result of interindustry shifts of the resources devoted to techno-
logical progress.
Over the period 1889—1957, the average deviation of the subperiod
rates of change in total factor productivity from the average rate for the
period as a whole is 0.4 per cent—less than one-quarter of the average
annual rate of growth. The average deviations are less, of course, for each
of the two major time-segments into which the trend was broken—O.2 and
0.3 per cent for 1889—1919 and 1919—57, respectively (see Table 4).
Taking the period as a whole again, for the sake of convenience, the
average deviation of subperiod rates of change in output per unit of labor
input is the same as that for total factor productivity—0.4 per cent. The
deviation for output per unit of capital input is absolutely greater, and
relatively much greater—0.7 per cent. Apparently, the forces that deter-
mine the growth of investment and capital stock in relation to output are
comparatively irregular in their operation.
Irregularity in the subperiod rates of change in input proportions—or,
to put it differently, in the rate of substitution of capital for labor—may
be due to changes in relative factor prices, in the propensity to save, or in
the nature of technological advance, all of which are interrelated. But the
effect on changes in productive efficiency does not seem to be marked.
8 The author is indebted to Milton Friedman for this suggestion.
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There is, however, a mild tendency for subperiod rates of change in capital
per unit of labor input to be positively correlated with subperiod rates of
change in output per unit of labor input.9 This tendency is consistent with
the fact that the average deviation of subperiod rates of change in total
factor productivity from the long-period rate is somewhat less than the
weighted mean of the average deviations of subperiod changes in each of the
partial productivity ratios from their secular rates of change.
TABLE 4
Private Domestic Economy:
Subperiod Rates of Change in Real Product and Productivity Ratios,
with Mean Deviations from Secular Rates, 1889—1957




AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES OF CHANGE
1889—1899 4.5 1.6 2.0 0.4
1899—1909 4.2 1.2 1.3 0.8
1909—19 3.0 1.1 1.5 0.3
1919—29 3.7 2.0 2.2 1.4
1929—37 0.1 1.6 1.8 0.9
1937—48 4.5 2.3 2.2 2.7
1948—57 3.6 2.3 3.1 —0.2
MEAN SUBPERIOD DEVIATIONS FROM LONG-PERIOD RATES
1889—1957 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.7
1889—1919 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2
1919—57 1.3 0.3 0.4 0.9
SOURCE: Table A-XXII.
ANNUAL CHANGES
Charts 3 and 4 show that annual variations relative to trends are much
greater than the relative subperiod variations. The average deviation of
the yearly percentage changes in productivity from the 1.8 per cent
average annual rate, 1889—1957, is 2.9; the average deviation of the change
in output per unit of labor input is somewhat less, while that for the
change in the output-capital ratio is much greater. The average annual
deviations of percentage changes in total factor productivity and labor
productivity are somewhat smaller when computed from the trend rates
for 1919—57, but they are still large.
In a few cases, the variations in annual productivity changes appear to
be erratic, traceable to random factors or, possibly, to erratic errors in the
The coefficient of rank correlation is +.29 (which is, however, not significant at the
5 per cent level).
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estimates.The sharp rises in 1901 and 1906, followed by partially
offsetting drops, appear to be of this character. The lower-than-trend
values in 1914, 1915, and 1917 may reflect the repercussions of World
War I, although it should be noted that productivity was well above trend
in 1944 and 1945.
Productivity and the business cycle. The major cause of annual fluctuations
in productivity change appears to be short-term changes in the scale of
production. Over those forty-seven years of the period 1889—1957 that
are characterized as reference cycle expansions, the average percentage
change in productivity was 2.8, compared with a 1.8 per cent average of
annual changes over the entire period.Over the twenty-one years
characterized as contractions, productivity fell by 0.5 per cent on the
average (see Table 5). The average deviations of the percentage changes
TABLE 5
Private Domestic Economy:
Change in Real Product and Productivity Ratios,
Years of Expansion and of Contraction, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage change)









1889—1957 47 6.7 2.8 2.4 4.0
1889—1919 20 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.5
1919—57 27 6.7 2.9 2.3 4.4
Years of contraction
1889—1957 21 —2.9 —0.5 1.3 —5.2
1889—1919 10 —1.5 —1.5 0.0 —4.9
1919—57 11 —4.1 0.3 2.5 —5.5
SOURCE: Table A-XXII.
during expansions are absolutely smaller and relatively much smaller than
are the average deviations during contractions. Productivity fell during
half of the contractions, and the fall was particularly marked during major
contractions. But in the other reference contractions, productivity rose.
Productivity rose by more than the trend rates of increase in the postwar
readjustment, 1918—19, and in three subsequent recessions, two of which
were very mild.
With respect to partial productivity, output per unit of labor input rose
only one-half as much in contractions as in expansions.Presumably,
certain types of "overhead" employees are kept on payrolls when output
falls, but are not so fully utilized as when production is expanding. Also,
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when output falls below the point of the optimum combination of labor
with fixed capital, it is to be expected that the productivity, or output
per unit of each of the factors will decline. A partial offset might be pro-
vided by an increase in the efficiency of individual workers to the extent
that less efficient workers are laid off first and those remaining exert more
effort in view of growing unemployment. It is also probable that the pace
of technological advance falls off a bit in recessions since investment in
new plant and equipment tends to decline and research and development
outlays to slacken despite the greater pressure towards cost reduction
stemming from falling profit margins. On the other hand, some cost
reductions can probably be achieved with little or no new capital and by
concentrating production in more efficient plants.
Output per unit of capital input actually falls in contractions. This is,
in part, a function of the technique of measuring capital input. We assume
proportionality with real capital stocks, since from the standpoint of
private ownership capital assets represent a real cost or charge regardless
of the intensity with which they are employed. This is certainly the case
when buildings or equipment are subject to long-term lease, or when they
are financed by borrowed funds on which regular interest payments must
be met. Even when equity capital is involved, presumably there must be
some average rate of return over the lifetime of the underlying real assets,
which is an implicit cost during recessions and must be incurred if capital
is to remain in the industry.
Unlike labor, which can be laid off under conditions of declining
activity (and subsequently does not represent a direct cost to private
industry), capital stocks usually continue to increase in mild recessions—
although the rate of increase declines as investment drops. Only in severe
contractions does gross investment drop below capital consumption
causing total capital stock to fall with output. Thus, when output falls,
the output-capital ratio will drop even more, as a rule. This does not
affect the subperiod or long-period changes since these are measured
between years of high activity which give time for capital to be adjusted,
more or less efficiently, to the volume of other inputs and to output.
Annual comparisons are, of course, a blunt instrument for cyclical
analysis.Monthly estimates adjusted for seasonal variation permit a
more refined analysis of changes in economic variables between turning
points and during both expansion and contraction phases. This study has
been confined to annual estimates, but a brief summary of the findings of
Thor Hultgren with respect to movements of output per manhour over
specific production cycles and the reference business cycle provides an
illuminating supplement to our annual comparisons.'0
10ThorHultgren, Changes in Labor Cost During Cycles in Production and Business, Occasional
Paper 74, New York (NBER), 1960.
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Hultgren assembled monthly output per manhour estimates for 23
industries for one or more cycles between 1921 and 1956, giving him obser-
vations on 74 expansions and 83 contractions. In terms of the turning
points identified in each industry output series (which mark production
cycles), in 91 per cent of the expansions output per manhour increased,
while in 72 per cent of the contractions output per manhour declined.
There was, however, a declining proportion of increases in output per
manhour during successive phases of expansion (from 88 to 68 per cent)
and an increasing proportion of increases during successive phases of
contraction (from 27 to 43 per cent).
At first glance, the positive relation between output and labor product-
ivity movements seems to contradict our findings based on annual private
domestic economy estimates, according to which output per manhour
rises in contractions as well as in expansions, although in significantly
lesser proportion. But it must be remembered that individual production
cycles frequently do not coincide with the general reference cycle in timing.
When they do not, the extent of the average industry expansion or con-
traction within the reference cycle dates is dampened. This influence is
strong enough to reverse the picture of the relationship in contractions.
In 76 per cent of Hultgren's 54 observations for. reference expansions,
output per manhour rose—a smaller percentage than prevailed during the
production cycle expansions.But in 69 per cent of the 65 reference
contractions, there was also a net increase in output per manhour as
opposed to a majority of declines in production contractions.In other
words, the adverse effect of declining volume is reduced, and the relative
impact of technological advance is increased. The use of annual averages
further accentuates the tendency towards rising output per manhour in
contractions.
It is interesting to note also the relationships over the phases of the
general business cycle. During expansions the percentage of observations
in which output per manhour rose declined from 76 in the first phase to
63 in the last phase—a less pronounced decline than in individual produc-
tion expansions.In the first phase of contraction, 48 per cent of the
measures of industry output per manhour rose; in the last phase, 69 per
cent were rising.
If monthly estimates of real capital stocks were available, it seems clear
that the positive relation between output and the output-capital ratio
would be more pronounced between turning points in the monthly reference
cycle than between turning points on an annual basis. The positive rela-
tion would be still more pronounced over production cycles in which
amplitudesofoutputfluctuation are greater than in thegeneral business cycle.
Variant annual productivity measures. It would be possible crudely to adjust
real capital stock estimates to make allowance for the hours of utilization
75FRODUCTIVITT IN THE TOTAL ECONOMT
CHART 5















Trend of total factor productivity (1919—53):
log y = 2.057 + 0,0090x; ory = 114.0(1.021)'
Nettrend (1919—53), holding ratio of employment
to civilian labor force constant (i.e. z = 0.965):
logy1.809+0.0088x +O,2715z, giving a
per annum growth rate of 2.0 per cent.
and thus achieve a formal consistency with the treatment of labor input.
If this were done, capital and total factor productivity would probably not
decline in most contractions, although the rate of increase would be re-
tarded, as in the case of labor productivity, since there would be departures
from optimum factor combinations. But such an adjustment to capital
would have a most tenuous statistical basis, and even theoretically would
be purely formal, since in a real sense productive efficiency does decline
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when capacity is utilized at rates significantly below those for which it was
created. In any case, the intermediate and long-term comparisons would
not be affected because there is no clear-cut evidence of a marked trend
in the degree of utilization of capital over time.1'
A more interesting possible variant of the productivity series involves
treating labor from the viewpoint of social cost, and counting unemployed
members of the labor force over and above a normal "frictional" pooi
(say 3.5 per cent of the labor force) as part of labor cost. The further
assumption is made that such persons—by definition willing and able to
work—are desirous of working the same average hours as those put in by
employed workers. This variant is shown for the period since 1919 in
Chart 5.It is seen that productivity so calculated falls significantly more
in years of marked depression than does our standard series—indicating
that the efficiency with which society utilizes its potential resources drops
more than does the productive efficiency of industry measured in terms of
private-enterprise costs. The virtual identity in the movements of the
alternative productivity series since World War II is a measure of the
greater efficiency with which our social organization now provides for
high levels of economic activity as compared with the 1930's and some
earlier depressed periods.
11SecBert G. Hickman, "Capacity, Capacity Utilization, and the Acceleration
Principle," Problems of Capital Formation: Concepts, Measurement, and Controlling Factors,
Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 19, Princeton University Press (for NBER),
1957, pp. 419—468.
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